Caliphate in the Balkans

Islamic State recruitment in the Balkans

The Islamic State gathered people from around the world. They were motivated by the creation of the Caliphate, and by the suffering of Muslims under the Assad regime. Not all of them came from Arab countries. ISIS released videos depicting blue-eyes and blonde fighters that weren’t converts. They came from the Balkans, the region with the highest number of Muslims in Europe.

Salafi Jihadism arrived in the Balkans during the Bosnia War. Back then, many Arab fighers arrived to fight along Bosnians against the Serbs. Some of them stayed in Bosnia even after the war ended. The Dayton Agreements required them to leave, although not everyone did. Among the legends of jihad that were forged in Bosnia were two 9/11 hijackers; 9/11 mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; 11M mastermind, Amer Azizi; Jamal al-Badawi, mastermind of the 2000 USS Cole bombing; and Bin Laden’s bodyguard, Abu Jandal. A few of them would later go to Kosovo.

NGOs from Persian Gulf countries worked after the war in the Balkan countries, like Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia. Some of those charities have conducted terrorist activities like money laundering, harboring jihadists from the Middle East, and planning terrorist attacks. Salafi jihadism was introduced this way to the region. However, it could not take root in Bosnia because the Bosniaks were too moderate for embracing Salafism.

Among the ripen fruits before Syria, Bosnian fighters went to Afghanistan, Chechnya Iraq and Yemen. A Macedonian fighter went also to Iraq. Mirsad Bektasevic, a Swedish citizen born in Montenegro, planned a terrorist attack in the Balkans and visited Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. But this pales when compared to Syria.

The Balkan countries with large number of Muslims, like Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo, are ranked among the top European exporters of fighters to Syria. Some of the jihadists went from Serbia and Macedonia. Between 2012 and 2016 approximately between 800-1000 fighters went to Syria from these states. There were 150 fighters from Albania, 358 from Kosovo, from where 15% were women; 156 from North Macedonia. Most of them joined the Islamic State. 200 Bosnian men and 70 Bosnian women joined the group between 2012 and 2016, as well as 81 children, sending one of the highest amount of women. Serbia and Montenegro sent the smallest numbers of foreign fighters, with 49 and 23 citizens respectively. However, all these numbers are estimated.

The mobilization of foreign fighters seems to have been more successful in countries were Muslims were a minority, like Serbia and Macedonia. This is because they usually live outside their original identity, believing the majority is oppressing them.

The Balkans in ISIS propaganda.

The recruitment methods varied. The Islamic State used the Balkans in some of its propaganda. On June 2015, the group released a video named “Indeed, Honor is in Jihad”. The video depicted fighters from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo. It called other Balkan Muslims to go to the Caliphate and threatened terror attacks in those countries. It had previously used video propaganda in 2013, using an Albanian to call for jihad against Assad. The group would later mention the region in its magazine, Rummiyah. In it, ISIS published an article named “The Balkans-Blood for Enemies, and Honey for Friends”. It threatens Serbs and Croats for their role in the Balkan wars.

Screenshot from “Indeed: Honor is in Jihad”. Fighters from the Balkans try to recruit more from their respectivr countries.

In Bosnia, the recruiters preached in unofficial mosques known as “paradzemati”. They often paid for the tickets to Istanbul to cross into Syria. This also happened in Macedonia. Many of the fighters were recruited in mosques outside the Islamic Community control. The radical preachers invited youngsters at night to hear their message. The radicalization and recruitment process were both in Internet and personally.

The recruiting process was more complex in Montenegro. The recruiters targeted women in order to reach men. Some of them convinced women to wear the hijab for triggering the radicalization of their families.

In Serbia, the recruits were reached via networks. There was the Furkan network, which was based in the Sandzak city of Novo Pazar and targeted marginalized groups. The recruiters also used the Furkan premises as a meeting place and base to send fighters to Syria and Iraq. They also organized recruitment and preparatory meetings across Serbia and arranged visits to the north-eastern Bosnian city of Gornja Maoca. These were hosted by imam Nusret Imamovic. There were also paradzemati with links to the Bosnian part of Sandzak. Radical preachers use the narrative of victimhood and the historical rhetoric of oppression by non-Muslims.

The Germany banned organization, Die Wahre Religion (The True Religion), which recruited 140 fighters for Syria and Iraq, was also active in the Balkans.

The recruits adopted the fundamentalist version of Islam known as Salafism. Some of them entered abruptly in religion, attending lectures and getting together with similarly minded people. The majority were between 20 and 35 years old. They also had very little work experience or unskilled. The high number of women and children from the Western Balkans was a distinctive, having a higher proportion than UE countries.

The profile can vary depending on the country. For example, one third of the recruits from Bosnia had criminal backgrounds. They came from hotbeds like Ovse and Gorjne Maoce, which operated under Sharia Law. They also went from Zenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Travnik and Bihac. Many of them went with their wives and children. There were Bosnian war veterans among the Bosnian ISIS contingent, although the majority had no combat experience

Kosovar ISIS commander. Source: Syria General Updates

A 76% of Kosovar foreign fighters were between 15 and 34 years old by 2014, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself as Caliph, 267 of them were men and 51 of them women. Most of them went from Pristina, with sixty-one fighters. In second place ranks Gjilan, Kosovo’s third largest city, with thirty-six. Prizren ranks in third place with thirty-one fighters. Municipalities in east and southeast regions are riper for recruitment. For example, Hani I Elezit recruited 11 per ten thousand fighters, compared to Pristina with two. Fifty-four of the jihadists came from below average economic conditions. In fact, they were more prone to join ISIS when compared against poorer fellow citizens or higher class. Thus, poverty did not manage to explain ISIS recruitment. Of the recruits, 76% were unemployed and 83-4% of the fighter had at least a secondary education level. Many of the fighters were seeking a leadership role. Kosovar fighters felt disillusioned and marginalized. It is also calculated that at least 70 percent were new to practicing Islam and had little religious education. They also came from nonpracticing families. 40% of the Kosovar contingent had criminal background. Radicalization focused on the border with Macedonia.

Recruits from North Macedonia were divided between Macedonians, Turks, and Albanians. Most fighters came from Skopje and nearby Albanian villages, Aracinovo, Saraj, Kumanovo, and Gostivar. Some others came from largely ethnic Albanian towns in northern and north-western Macedonia. Many were between the late teens and their twenties. They were recruited in the Tutunzus mosque, in Gazi Baba.

Serbian recruits went from the Muslim majority Novo Pazar. Many of them were from the Bosniak or the Roma marginalized community, which faces very poor economic conditions and are not very integrated into society. Besides Sandzak in Novo Pazar, the recruitment also took place in Smederevo and in the Belgrade suburb of Zemun.

The majority of Albanian recruits came from mosques that were out of control of the Islamic Community of Albania. Many of them had poor religious education. Thirteen of the 150 Albanian recruits were women. Thirty-one were children, from which there were 26 minors. They came from Pogradec. Ethnic Albanian foreign fighters were between 17-70 years old, with the majority being 30.

The Montenegrin recruits came from the Montenegrin part of Sandzak. They had problems with religious leaders and felt marginalized and betrayed by their own community.

There were different reasons for them to return. Many of the returnees were sent home by the ISIS leadership, although some fell disillusioned.

Among those that returned to Syria, there were 45 from Albania; 133 from Kosovo; 80 to North Macedonia; 10 from Montenegro. 50 to Bosnia; and 7 to Serbia.

From the returnees, it seems that at least 15 posed a threat to Albania. The Bosnian security and police agencies consider that all returnees from Syria and Iraq are dangerous. At least 25 of them have been prosecuted.

Kosovo brokered an agreement with the Kurds and the Syrian government to take back 110 nationals that went to Syria. 32 of those repatriated were women and 74 children. Not all Kosovar returnees proved to be a danger. For example, we have Albert Berisha. He went to Syria in October 2013, but returned after nine days because of infighting between the Syrian opposition. He was convicted in Kosovo for membership in a terrorist organization, although he stated it was not his intention. He established the Institute for Integration, Security and Deradicalization (INSID) along with Liridon Kabashi, another returnee. The INSID is an NGO dedicated to the rehabilitation and reintegration of former foreign fighters. However, not all have cooperated with the deradicalization program.

In 2016 there was a foiled plot to carry out simultaneous attacks in the region, including one against the Israeli soccer team in Albania. At least one of them fought in Syria.

There was a concern that returnees from Syria could clash with returnees from Ukraine, thus reinflaming tensions in the Balkans. Not all returnees represented an apparent risk. This is because some of them were disillusioned by what they saw in Syria or did not identified anymore with ISIS. However, the disillusioned ones not necessarily reject the ideology, but the leadership and tactics.

It is worth mentioning that a mass return was not expected.

Conclusions

Jihad arrived to the Balkans in the nineties thanks to the Arab fighters and charities. Among the results, was that some of the local people began to fight abroad, as well as some of the deadliest terror attacks in history.

There is no country in the Balkans free of the foreign fighter recruiting phenomenon for Syria. The high number of women recruited is worth mentioning and studying. The recruiting happened both in persona and by internet, in part mentioning the history of the Balkans. Each country has also its own dynamics of recruitment. There’s no single profile, and it depends also on the country to see who went to Syria. However, the recruitment is limited to certain areas, that’s a characteristic. The returnees are high in some countries like Albania, and Kosovo. Interestingly, Bosnia saw one of the lowest returnee rates. Macedonia could have faced a high risk, with more than a half returnee rate. Sebia saw little percentage of returnees, logical if seen that Serbia had the lowest number of fighters, but the dynamics could mean a greater risk for Serbia. Despite having a low export of foreign fighters, Montenegro saw a high rate of returnees with similar dynamics to Serbia.

It is also seen that not all returnees represented immediate danger. Although some of them participated in terror plots, some returned disillusioned. A possible clash between returnees from Ukraine and returnees from Syria is worth observing. The deradicalization program in Kosovo is also worth watching.

Guillermo is a journalist, writer and independent international analyst. If you like what you read, please support him by donating:

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