The ISIS leader is not like his predecessors
He leading the group to make a comeback
The Islamic State has its fifth and latest caliph, and notable changes—including gains across multiple areas of operation and in capabilities—have been noted since his naming and arrival. However, the man himself is enigmatic, and few details are known about him.
ISIS fighters in Iraq pledge allegiance to Abu Hafs
Ten years after the Caliphate was declared by international Jihadist terrorist organization, the Islamic State (IS), and five years after it lost its territory, IS has had its ups and downs. Currently, the group is trying to make a comeback in regions beyond the Levant, where it began and made major gains until being rolled back. Some notable attacks have occurred in countries with hard security apparatuses, such as Iran and Russia, while IS has at the same time tried to maintain a toehold in its origin country of Iraq and neighboring Syria, after facing major losses from the US and allied coalitions, as well as from the forces allied with Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad.
US officials warn that the group is still active and expanding its presence by forming partnerships with other militants in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. There have also been many interdicted plots in Europe, India and Israel, alongside successful lone-wolf attacks. This new increase in activity comes after Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi took over as the fifth Caliph of the Islamic State in the summer of 2023. The whole IS network remained the deadliest international terrorist organization in 2023.
Currently, Abu Hafs has ordered,through his spokesman, attacks against Israel in revenge for the current war in Gaza. The campaign’s name is “Kill Them Wherever you Find Them”.
ISIS fighters in Syria pledge allegiance to Abu Hafs
It is unclear at this point who Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi might be. It has been suggested that he is the IS leader in Somalia, formerly known as Abdul Qadir Mumin. However, this can be a complicated assessment, as technically the Caliph traditionally must be descended from the Quraysh tribe, an Arab tribe from which the Prophet Muhammed was born. There are stories among Muslims on the Horn of Africa mentioning that a local figure in Somalia descended from that tribe. There have been also been rumors that the current Caliph went from Iraq/Syria to Somalia via Yemen. Some also claim that he could either be Abu Khadijah al-Iraqi or Abu al-Muthanna al-Janubi. Both are Iraqis. He has been described as “an honourable imam” and a “veteran of jihad against crusaders and apostates”.
Currently, IS holds no significant territorial control in Syria nor Iraq. It is waging a low-level insurgency, though it has made alarming gains within its Afghanistan branch, (Islamic State Khorasan Province—ISKP), locally in that Central Asian country, which has expanded its own operations abroad.
In the Levant, IS mostly fights against Assad’s forces in central Syria. Meanwhile, it has maintained its presence in rural desert areas in Iraq. On March 2024 it was mentioned that a resurgence could not be ruled out. 2023 was the year that the group was most active in almost ten years. That year, there were 121 attacks in Syria and Iraq. The US Central Command stated that the group had about 2500 fighters in its heartland, with at least 1000 at large in Iraq. It has also stated that the number of fighters in both countries are set to be doubled.
Their attacks have increased by 4%. On July 2024, it was reported that IS was doubling its attacks since 2023. It conducted 153 in both countries in the first half of 2024. Despite this figure, attacks in Iraq seem to be decreasing. In a six-month period, IS conducted only 35 attacks there. However, attacks in Syria reached 551 in areas controlled by the Assad government and US-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). (The Iranian-backed militia attacks on US forces in Iraq have complicated the matter.) IS in the Levant (ISIL/ISIS) has carried out attacks in Deir Ezzor, Homs, Hama, and Hasakah. It has ambushed Iranian militias in Homs. The group has improved its infiltration capabilities in Syria, posing as Syrian or Iranian soldiers. Furthermore, ISIL has carried out complex assaults, ambushes, raids, and even attacked hardened security checkpoints.
ISIL has also attempted to bring back its shadow governance in Syria, taxing local business and extorting them. Deir Ezzor is an example, where it imposes Zakat on truffle pickers and traders. ISIL had claimed by march 2024 84 attacks in Syria. Occasionally, it gains a little territorial control.
In Iraq, amidst local Sunni reluctance to see the group regain territorial and administrative control, its cells now operate in a decentralized way in Salahuddin, Diyala, Anbar, and Baghdad.
ISKP has been active during Abu Hafs tenure, especially in plotting external attacks. European officials have thwarted plots linked to the Khorasan province, warning that in 2024 there would be a threat of ISKP plots against the West originating from the area. In the first half of 2024, there were seventeen plots linked to ISKP. The Afghanistan-Pakistan branch was involved in major external operations, such as the Crocus Concert Hall attack in Moscow; the January 2024 Kerman attacks; the Turkey Catholic Church attack; etc. Within their own immediate area of influence, ISKP has intensified its assaults against civilian and Taliban targets. ISKP has found in Afghanistan a safehaven, despite Taliban measures to counter the organization. However, ISKP grew weaker through the second year of Taliban rule, decreasing attacks inside the country. UN experts mention that this group’s fighters pose the most serious internal terrorist threat to Afghanistan and perhaps Central Asia on whole. The group is estimated to have 4000-6000 fighters in Afghanistan.
The Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow was one of the most important attacks during Abu Hafs leadership
In Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria and Somalia, there has been an increase in the Islamic State’s influence and “governance”, foreign fighter mobilizations and even external operations. The Islamic State’s Sahel Province has consolidated its control in Mali, near the Nigerien border. It has been able to implement hudud2 punishments in some cities. IS has also increased large scale attacks. It claimed 15 attacks by September 2023 in Mali alone. On June 2024, the group claimed its first suicide attack by vehicle born improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Mali since 2020. The attack killed and wounded 30 soldiers. The group has even managed to besiege cities like Menaka in Mali, and tax local economic activity in areas under its direct control. The lethality of its attacks in Africa has increased, with five times as many fatalities per month since July 2023. It has also expanded taxation activities in northern Niger. Recent gains made by the group in Africa have also attracted foreign fighters. In August 2023, the UN reported that the group was establishing corridors between Europe and the Sahel. In October 2023 and February 2024, Moroccan authorities disrupted three cells facilitating foreign fighter travel to the Sahel.
IS in Somalia has expanded control since April 2024, even resting territory away from the country’s other notorious militant al-Qaeda aligned Jihadist organization, al-Shabaab. They recently took over most of the Cal Miskaad Mountain range in Somalia. This has allowed them to fund activities overseas, such as those conducted by ISKP.
The Islamic State’s branch in Mozambique (ISM) increased its attack rates from December 2023 through February 2024, for a total of 57 attacks up until March 2024. ISM also captured the town of Mucojo and held it for 10 days. They later captured the city of Quissanga, on March 2nd, and held it for two weeks. The regional network in Africa possibly provided guidance and resources to ISM, leading to its successes.
The Islamic State has increased its attacks in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burkina Faso [need a proper link], while the group’s activity has been declining in Libya and Yemen.
On August 10, 2023, some days after the naming of Abu Hafs, IS militants carried out an ambush on two buses in Syria transporting regime forces through the desert, killing 33 men.
On August 19, 2023, the group attacked and killed 100 Boko Haram fighters in Borno, Nigeria. Five days later, IS again attacked its rivals, in Duguri, in the Kukawa area killing 41 more fighters.
On October 23rd, they carried out an ambush with multiple SVBIEDs, killing dozens of Nigerien soldiers.
On October 24th, IS fighters killed 50 members of al-Qaeda-linked JNIM group in the Bani area of Burkina Faso.
On November 2023, the group carried out a joint operation alongside JNIM in Niger.
On January 3rd, 2024, IS launched a double suicide bombing in Kerman, Iran, killing 84 people during a commemoration of Qassem Soleimani—the IRGC commander assassinated by the United States in 2020.
On January 29th, the group claimed an attack on a Catholic Church in Istanbul, which killed one person during mass.
At the beginning of 2024, the IS’s Somalia Province overtook the al-Miskaad Mountains, killing 50 al-Shabaab jihadi fighters in the process.
On February 9th, 2024, the group assaulted a Mozambican army post in Mucojo, killing 20 soldiers.
In late March, IS fighters ambushed a Quds Brigade vehicle in a road between Homs and Palmyra, Syria
One of the most important attacks of Abu Hafs’s tenure was the March 2024 attack on the Crocus City Hall complex in Moscow. Tajik jihadists killed 135 people attending a performance at a concert hall.
On April 2024, the group carried out a missile attack, killing 22 Quds Force members in Syria. The same month IS captured segments of the road between Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. It entered villages, killed four soldiers, looted shops and confiscated military and civilian vehicles.
IS carried out its most important attack in Iraq in May 2024, killing five Iraqi soldiers along with a commander, and wounding others between Salahuddin and Diyala.
On June 13, the group ambushed a group of soldiers in Mali. The attack killed 30 men, and was the first SVBIED attack since 2020. It took place in the R20 road linking Menaka and Ansongo.
On June 22nd, 2024, the group carried out a complex attack in Makhachkala and Derbent, Dagestan, Russia. It targeted two Orthodox Churches, a Synagogue, and a police post, killing 20 people, mostly policemen, and Fr. Nikolai Kotelnikov, a 66-year-old priest.
On July 15th, the group carried out the first jihadi attack in Oman. It attacked the Imam Ali Mosque in Muscat, killing six people.
Assessment
Although the identity of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi is still unknown, the group has seen a strengthening of capabilities in the last year. High profile attacks like those in Russia prove its durability and growing capacity to carry out attacks beyond its areas of control.
The increase in capabilities in Syria, where it has launched more complex attacks, coincides with the arrival of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, which have become both more frequent and sophisticated. In neighboring Iraq, IS seems to have made some gains as well, though they face many challenges from within the Iraqi Sunni Muslim community itself as well as from the government and Iran-backed forces.
The comeback of high-profile external operations also coincides with the arrival of Abu Hafs. It is possible that all of this is linked to his orders to carry out attacks in revenge for the ongoing war in Gaza.
The group has also used ISKP extensively for external operations, taking advantage of vacuums of authority in certain regions of Afghanistan.
IS has also been opening new fronts, like in Oman.
Conclusion
The strengthening of IS in Syria could be linked to the arrival of IS’s fifth and latest caliph. The situation in Gaza has distracted many actors from the fight against IS. However, it is likely that the leader of the group is looking to take advantage of the situation in Palestine, and now perhaps in Lebanon as well.
Increased external attacks could also be linked to the arrival of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. While the strengthening of the group in Africa largely is due internal factors within the countries where IS has a strong presence, an increase of activity is also notable following his ascension to caliph.
Guillermo is a journalist, writer and independent international analyst. If you like what you read, please support him by donating:
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