The Gaza War has seen action from different actors across the globe, all aligned with Iran. One of those actors have been the Houthis, a militia in Yemen that currently rule the country. On March 5th, 2025, the second Trump Administration designated them as terrorists.
The Houthis are also known as Ansar Allah. They claim to descend directly from Prophet Muhammad’s family via the Zaydi Imamates that ruled north Yemen until 1962, gaining socio-religious legitimacy in parts of the country. They have obtained status to gain support from tribal confederations from the North. Some of them call for a return to the “rule of the Zaydi imam”, but their goals are nor religious nor internationally focused. They also focus on fighting Saudi influence and putting an end to Saudi-funded preaching in Sa’ada.
By 2022, they controlled 14 of 21 provinces of Yemen, including the capital, Sana’a.
Source: War Noir
Saudi Arabia labelled them as a terrorist organization in March 2014.
They have limited relationships, almost all inside the Axis of Resistance, encompassing Iran, and Hezbollah, with some Iranian-backed paramilitary groups in Iraq. They have been accused of aiming to restore the centuries long imamate that ruled Yemen, at the same time of being part of a Shia revolutionary plan mirroring Iranian geopolitical ambitions.
Some say that the Houthis aren’t an Iranian proxy, having its own base, interests and ambitions. This has been shown by the Houthis attacking Saudi and Emirati targets that were not approved by Iran.
The first Trump administration designated them as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation on January 2021. The Biden administration reversed the move weeks later. On 2025, the Trump administration re designated them.
Their rule in Yemen has seen a big amount of human rights abuses. These include torture, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and extra judicial killings.
The Houthi leader is Abdulmalik al-Houthi. Its role can be compared to the one of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
It seems there are two centers of power. The first is the Saada Wing, which coalesces around Abdulmalik’s brother in law Mahdi al-Mashat, who leads the SPC. This wing is viewed as close to Iran and Hezbollah. It is extremely paranoid. The second wing is the Military Wing. It is lead by Abdulmalik’s cousin, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, who heads the SRC; and by the Chief of Houthi Military Intelligence, Abdullah “Abu Ali al-Hakim”.
Houthi governance relies on informal positions, as well as relationships and partnerships. The Houthis have invested efforts in developing a comprehensive military human resources system. They claimed a mobilization capacity of 708,000 people before the war in Gaza. This is run by the Ministry of Defense General Mobilization Authority. They have also a man responsible for anti-Israel operations. He is only known as Abu Fatima.
The Houthis operate in Yemen.
The origins of the Houthis could be traced back to 1982, with Salah Ahmed Flutah making the first thoughtful move. Part of his teachings included the principles of the Iranian revolution. Then, with the reunification of Yemen, the group of Believing Youth was established. It began with summer cultural centers teaching the Zaidi doctrine of Shia Islam. It was chaired by Sheikh Mohammed Yahya Salem Azzam. It was a religious and cultural forum, nothing to do with military or political action. The establishment phase was from 1990 to 1994. During this stage, there were amendments for everything. They recruited new workers, studying new things, introducing new activities, as well as new ideas and visions. The aim was to educate young people, getting them out of narrow-mind and intolerance. However, Hussein Badr el-Din al-Houthi had other plans in mind. He was able to lead the Believing Youth because he was seen as a religious leader that descended from the Prophet. He organized activities to “purge Zaidisim of Wahhabism”.
Hussein Badr el-Din al-Houthi took refuge in Qom, Iran.
However, Houthi activity was also registered in the 1960 war against Egyptian occupiers. Back then, they employed brutality to punish rivals. They executed sheikhs, beheaded captives, displaying bodies in public places, executing children from offending families, among others.
They aimed to bolster the cultural and political influence of Zaydi Shia Islam in the newly reunited Yemen.
They were involved in the Zaydi revival in the 1990s and the two major organizations associated with it. These were the Hizb al-Haqq party, the first modern Zaydi political party; and Shahab al-Mumanin, a socioreligious movement appealing to a broader and younger audience.
Little by little, Hussein Badr el-Din al-Houthi won influence in the Zaidi areas of Yemen, until he led a rebellion in Saada, knowing that he couldn’t overthrow the Yemeni government by that point. That was because Yemen was unified, and the Zaidis were a minority. He also managed to establish a relation with Iran. Hussein Badr el-Din stayed in Iran in 1994. From Saada, he expanded his influence to other areas.
They also established charitable and humanitarian work in the poor areas ignored by the government, areas where neither charitable organizations reached.
The started to be politically active in 2003, opposing Ali Abdullah Saleh for backing the US led invasion of Iraq. During this time, they wanted a greater role in national affairs; an end to political, economic and cultural marginalization in Zaydi areas, and an end to Saudi-funded proselytizing in Sa’ada.
The first confrontation with the Yemeni government ended in 2004, with the death of their leader, Hussein al-Houthi.
Between 2004 and 2010 there was a conflict between the Yemeni government and the Houthis, known as the Saada wars. Ali Abdullah Saleh launched a campaign against them with US and Saudi support, accusing the Houthis of being an Iranian instrument. However, the government of Yemen imposed a blackout on this conflict, thus information on these is scarce. The government adopted a heavy handed approach towards the conflict, and failed to quench the rebellion. However, the first one started on June 18th, 2004. On September the same year, the government killed the leader, Hussein al-Houthi. His father, Badr el-Din, would lead the organization for a period of time. He later passed the reins of the organization to Hussein’s half brother, Abdulmalik al-Houthi in 2005. He would lead the group until the Gaza war started in 2023, with its subsequent escalations involving the Houthis.
However, by 2010, the Houthis were able to fight the Yemeni government in four provinces, seize and hold strategic towns, cause rivals to surrender, and carve out tactical footholds inside Saudi border settlements.
The Saada wars would reach the last ceasefire in 2010. Shortly after, the Arab Spring started. This led the Houthis to continue as an insurgent group while they engaged in politics at the same time. They aimed for the fall of the regime when the Arab Spring started. In the aftermath, the 2011 revolution allowed the Houthis to influence the renegotiation of the future political regime. They boycotted the aftermath elections in which Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi won. The clash between the elites and the aspirations of the disenfranchised sectors in Yemen led to the adequate circumstances for the Houthi movement to lead the national political process. By then, the group had evolved into a political movement and a disciplined militia similar to Hezbollah.
On September 21st, 2014, the Houthi Movement conquered Saan’a. During this time, they allied with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, they did not cede territory to their ally nor they did let him govern.
In 2014, they agreed to release al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula members from Houthi prisons. Among them was Marwan al-Raymi, security officer of AQAP in Taiz.
On January 2015, the Houthis overthrew President Hadi. They issued their own constitutional declaration and established their own government bodies. This led to international condemnation and backlash, with the US, as well as EU and Gulf countries closing their embassies.
During the war with Saudi Arabia, they struck critical infrastructure, including Saudi energy facilities.
In 2016, they fired anti cruise missiles at the USS Mason. The ship was navigating in international waters.
On December 2017, the Houthis murdered their former ally, President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
In 2019, the Houthis fired a missile to Abha international airport, in southwestern Saudi Arabia, injuring 29 people.
In 2022, they struck Abu Dhabi international airport.
Between 2015 and 2021, they launched 430 ballistic missiles and deployed 851 armed drones at Saudi targets.
Since they took power, there was an increase in child marriages. The Houthis have also imposed travel restrictions that have curtailed women’s mobility and labor market participation by making them secure the permission of a mahram or sanctioned relative guardian. In 2023 they imposed more restrictions on women’s covering. Also, they have imposed burdens on women working on NGO’s, and on those whose job implies travel and mixing sexes.
The UN brokered a six-month ceasefire in April 2022, the agreement expired six months later.
Fighting between the Houthis and the Saudi led coalition subsided in 2023. The same year, they exchanged about eight hundred prisoners during three days. There was a ceasefire between the Saudis and the Houthis when the October 7 attacks on Israel were launched.
On October 19th, 2023, they entered the Gaza War by launching cruise missiles and drone strikes against Israel. There were nine waves of strikes against Israel between October and December 2023. These include ballistic missiles, Quds-type missiles, one-way attack drones.
On October 22nd, 2023, the Houthis threatened to target ships linked to Israel in the Red Sea. Then, they shifted their focus to deliberately sink vessels. However, they have also targeted Chinese and Iranian ships, allies of the Houthis. Other ships are from Barbados, or Palau with Syrian sailors. Their campaign caused the top ten shipping and logistics firms to stop travelling through the area. By painting the attacks as part of a mission for relieving Palestine, they boost support at home.
However, it has been said that their attacks in the Red Sea are to bolster the Yemeni nation under their leadership while deterring the US and its allies, that resist the movement militarily. It is also said that these attacks are to demonstrate that its guerrilla attacks are useful when facing the most formidable militaries.
Saudi Arabia began its air campaign against them on March 26th, 2015.
They evolved from defending the Zaydi tradition into translating their military success into political influence. Its main proposals were getting rid of foreign influence and fighting corruption.
On November 18th 2023, they hijacked a cargo ship named Galaxy Leader. They would later turn it into a tourist attraction for Yemenis.
On December 2023, the US established a new Red Sea and Indian Ocean task force, named Operation Prosperity Guardian. The coalition has now more than twenty countries. They also issued warnings to the Houthis to stop targeting ships. The US and the UK launched airstrikes some weeks later.
From at least May 2024, the Houthis initiated a campaign against civil society actors. They rounded up and detained of NGO workers, humanitarian aid agencies, and domestic civil society organizations. The Houthis recorded and broadcasted them in social media Houthi-controlled media platforms. They accused them of spying for the US and Israel with their present or past employment. They later mentioned they wouldn’t allow NGOs to hire or appoint local staff without permission from the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation.
Both Iran and Hezbollah have financed the Houthis. This via the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, but the extent is not known.
In the early 2000’s, they were collecting voluntary contributions from businessmen, taxes from ordinary citizens in Northern Yemen, and donations for the Palestinian cause.
After the conquest of Sanaa, they also began to collect revenues from Yemen’s gas and oil fields, levy taxes and fees, and appropriate costumes revenue from the port of Hodeidah.
It seems they have a solid support base of their own.
On August 2014, they conquered the Yemeni capital, Sana’a.
On January 19th, 2015, the Houthis attacked the Presidential Palace in Sana’a. This led to the resignation of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.
On December 2017, the Houthis killed former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
On January 14, 2024, they fired anti-ship cruise missiles towards the USS Laboon, which was in international waters. However, US aircraft shot them down.
Conclusions
The Houthis are a movement composed by Yemeni tribals that claim to descend from the Prophet Muhammad. They are not exactly an Iranian proxy. The militia aims to revive the Zaydi Imamate. Yemen is their operation ground. Their relations with the Axis of Resistance are limited. They have gained their support by establishing humanitarian work in the areas they control. The Houthis were inspired by the 1970 Islamic Revolution. Although they have confronted Israel, for long their priority was getting Yemen rid of Saudi influence. Currently, they rule Yemen, with a bad record of human rights. Their rule also has damaged NGO’s and civil society actors, accused of spying for the US and Israel. The organization is quite well structured, with military wings, and those responsible for the relations with Iran and Hezbollah, as well as those responsible for confronting Israel since October 2023. Via alliances, like that one with Ali Abdullah Saleh, made them get into power. The Arab Spring also helped them. Some of their biggest attacks have been against Israel, US military targets, and Saudi strategical targets. They have also attacked trade during the Gaza War. Their narrative is aimed at defending Gaza, but they aim to bolster their support at home. They receive money from Iran, the Houthis, collecting voluntary contributions, revenues from natural resources and ports, and taxes. They have a solid base of supporters.
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